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CASE NOTES 1 .
CONTEMPT-THE QUESTIONABLE EXISTENCE OF
INHERENT CONTEMPT POWER
After a temporary escape, the police of Manchester, New Hampshire
apprehended a motorcyclist, Jon L. Houghton, and his passenger, Joseph
R. Moquin, for the violation of six motor vehicle laws. During interroga-
tion, apparently in an effort to salvage Houghton's already clouded driving
record, license, and police record, the two men led the police to believe
that Moquin was the driver. To the ensuing complaints in the Municipal
Court of Manchester Moquin responded' nolo contendere; and he then
paid the imposed fines. Later Moquin went to the law office of the judge
who had heard the complaints and related that in fact he had not been
the operator of the motorcycle at the time alleged in the complaints. The
next day similar complaints were issued against Houghton who pleaded
guilty to the offenses charged. Before imposing fines the judge called
both men to the bench where upon questioning both admitted their pre-
vious switch. Later, after a capias was issued to "show cause," the court
found that the defendants had perpetrated a fraud upon the court, that
their conduct constituted an obstruction of justice, and that they were
guilty of contempt. In response to the reserved and transferred questions
of law: whether the Municipal Court had jurisdiction over such contempt
proceedings; whether the judge had authority to try the respondents in
the contempt proceedings; and whether the Court had authority to impose
the fines contemplated, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire answered
affirmatively and remanded the cause. State v. Moquin, 191 A.2d 541.
(N.H. 1963).
Two issues of importance are raised by this decision, first whether
the Municipal Court of Manchester had the power to proceed as it did,
second whether, assuming the power to have been in the Court, the acts
of the defendants were properly punished as contempt of court. This note
is written to examine these issues in detail.
Mr. Justice Lampron, author of the majority opinion, apparently was
satisfied that other jurisdictional questions were not raised, and wrote:
"The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the very organization of
all courts and is essential to the functioning of our judicial system."' He
cites several cases to support this idea. One of these cases concerns justices
of the peace. 2 The case of State v. Matthews supports the idea expressed.
A search back through the authorities leads to a paraphrase of William
Blackstone that ".... as power, therefore, in the supreme courts of justice
1191 A.2d 541, 543 (N.H. 1963).
2 State ex rel. Welsh v. Towle, 42 N.H. 540, 546 (1861), holding "that as to justices
of the peace .. .the power is expressly conferred by statute."
8 37 N.H. 450 (1859).
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to supress such attempts (to contemn the courts) by an immediate attach-
ment of the offender, results from the first principles of judicial establish-
ments, and must be an inseparable attendant upon every judicial tribunal."'4
Next, as also do the dissenting Justices, the court cites Opinion of the
Justices.5 Here the Justices, in response to legislative inquiry as to the
Constitutional questions raised by proposed legislation, after giving a
scholarly recital of the old chestnut about necessity begetting summary
contempt power, 6 stated that "as before pointed out, it is the law in this
state that the power to punish for contempt is an essential attribute of a
court of general jurisdiction." The other citations, from other jurisdic-
tions, support the view taken."'7
This examination of local authorities becomes important in view of
the complex question of a court's power to punish for contempt.8 Forty-
seven of the fifty states have had reported cases touching upon this point.9
Excluding New Hampshire for the moment, in sixteen states contempt
power is said to inhere in all courts. 10 In twenty-eight states contempt
power is said to inhere in courts of general or superior jurisdiction," or in
4 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 286", paraphrased in Tenny's Case, 23 N.H. 162, 166
(1851).
5 86 N.H. 597, 602, 166 Atl. 640, 646 (1933). (Emphasis added.)
6 See generally Goldfarb, The History of the Contempt Power, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 1.
7 State v. Jackson, 147 Conn. 167, 158 A.2d 166 (1960); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S.
375 (1962).
8 See generally, Annots., 8 A.L.R. 1543; 54 A.L.R. 318; 73 A.L.R. 1185.
9 No cases have been found for Alaska, Arizona, or Delaware.
10 Arkansas, Pace v. State, 177 Ark. 512, 7 S.W.2d 29 (1928); but see Ex parte Patter-
son, 110 Ark. 94, 161 S.W. 173 (1913). Connecticut, State v. Jackson, 147 Conn. 167, 158
A.2d 166 (1960); but see McCarthy v. Hugo, 82 Conn. 262, 73 At. 778 (1909). Illinois,
People v. Siegal, 400 Ill. 208, 79 N.E.2d 616 (1948). Louisiana, State ex Tel. Collins, 237
La. 111, 110 So.2d 545 (1959). Mississippi, Melvin v. State, 210 Miss. 132, 48 So.2d 856
(1950). Montana, State ex tel Renkin v. District Court, 58 Mont. 276, 191 Pac. 772
(1920). New Mexico, State ex tel Bliss v. Greenwood, 63 N.M. 156, 315 P.2d 223 (1957).
North Carolina, In re Deaton, 105 N.C. 59, 11 S.E. 244 (1890). Oklahoma, Brown v.
State, 89 Okla. Crim. 443, 209 P.2d 715 (1949). Oregon, Taylor v. Gladden, 377 P.2d 14
(Oregon 1962). Pennsylvania, Marco Industries v. United Steelworkers, 401 Pa. 299,
164 A.2d 205 (1960). Tennessee, Loy v. Loy, 32 Tenn App. 470, 222 S.W.2d 873 (1949).
Vermont, In re Consolidated Rendering Co., 80 Vt. 55 (1907). Virginia, Nichols v.
Commonwealth, 186 Va. 315, 42 S.E.2d 306 (1947). Wisconsin, Appeal of Chicon, 227
Wis. 62, 278 N.W. 1 (1938). Wyoming, Application of Stone, 77 Wyo. 1, 305 P.2d 777
(1957).
11 California, People v. Clemmons, 208 A.C.A. 756, 25 Cal. Reptr. 467 (1962). Florida,
Ducksworth v. Boyer, Fla., 125 So.2d 844 (1960). Indiana, La Grange v. State, 238 Ind.
689, 153 N.E.2d 593 (1958). Massachusetts, New England Novelty Co. v. Sandberg, 315
Mass. 739, 54 N.E.2d 915 (1944). Minnesota, In re Cary, 165 Minn. 203, 206 N.W. 402
(1925). Missouri, Zeitinger v. Mitchell, 244 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. App. 1951). Nebraska, Kas-
parek v. May, 174 Neb. 732, 119 N.W.2d 512 (1963). North Dakota, State v. Markuson,
5 N.D. 147, 64 N.W. 934 (1895). Ohio, In re Shelton, 103 Ohio App. 436, 145 N.E.2d 673
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courts of record, 12 or in constitutional courts. 13 Two states look to the
statutes only.14
The recognition of inherent power to punish for contempt in "ranking"
courts by the twenty-eight jurisdictions above mentioned does not pre-
clude the recognition of inherent power in other "inferior" courts, but
the pronouncements as given do clearly avoid the sweeping recognition
given in the first mentioned states. Indeed the issue raised here will not
arise in many states in the face of statutes giving contempt powers broad
enough for all practical work to all or most of the courts. 15 The issue has
otherwise been skirted by deeming a court, of whatever rank in the judi-
cial hierarchy, in which cases are docketed, judgements recorded, etc., to
be of record, thus possessing inherent contempt power. 16
In a few cases the contempt powers of courts similar to the Municipal
Court of Manchester have been considered.' 7 The contempt power of a
"court for the trial of small causes" was questioned in Rhinehart v. Lance,'8
and the court declared: "Such a power is not a necessary incident of a
court of justice, and therefore is not granted by implication. It can only
be derived from the common law or by a legislative grant of such a
power." The "Criminal Court of Memphis" had asserted contempt power
in State v. Galloway, 9 only to learn on appeal that "the inferior courts of
Tennessee have no power to punish as contempts, the acts or omissions of
(1957). South Carolina, State v. Goff, 228 S.C. 17, 88 S.E.2d 788 (1955). South Dakota,
Evans v. Unruh, 107 N.W.2d 917 (1961). Texas, Ex parte Densser, 30 Tex. App. 566, 173
S.W. 1111 (Crim. App. 1891). Utah, In re Evans, 42 Utah 282, 130 Pac. 217 (1913).
"2Alabama, Ex parte Stephenson, 34 Ala. App. 1, 40 So.2d 713 (1947). Colorado,
People ex rel. Connor v. Stapleton, 18 Colo. 568, 33 Pac. 167 (1893). Idaho, McDougall
v. Sheridan, 23 Idaho 191, 128 Pac. 954 (1913). Iowa, Harding v. McCullough, 236 Iowa
556, 19 N.W.2d 613 (1945). Kansas Ex parte Gambrell, 161 Kan. 4, 165 P.2d 760 (1946).
Kentucky, Young v. Knight, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 195 (1959). Maine, Charles Cushman Co.
v. Mucksay, 135 Me. 490, 200 Atl. 505 (1938) Maryland, Hitzelberger v. State, 173 Md.
435, 196 Atl. 288 (1938). Michigan, In re Scott, 342 Mich. 614, 71 N.W.2d 71 (1955).
New Jersey, Board of Health v. N.Y. Central R.R., 10 N.J. 284, 90 A.2d 736 (1952).
Rhode Island, In the Matter of Jenckes, 6 R.I. 18 (1859).
'3 Georgia, Hewitt v. State, 12 Ga. App. 168, 76 S.E. 1054 (1913). Hawaii, Applica-
tion of Baucan, 44 Hawaii 271, 353 P.2d 631 (1960). Nevada, State v. District Court, 52
Nev. 270, 286 Pac. 418 (1930). Washington, State v. Estill, 55 Wash.2d 576, 349 P.2d 210
(1960).
14 New York, People ex rel. Clarke v. Truesdall, 79 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1948). West Vir-
ginia, State ex rel. McNinch v. Porter, 105 W. Va. 441, 143 S.E. 93 (1928).
15 E.g. DmL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 (1953).
16 Board of Health v. N.Y. Central R.R., 10 N.J. 284, 90 A.2d 736 (1952).
17 See generally MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO, A BRIEF ON CONTEMPT OF COURT IN
ILLINOIS (circa 1920).
1843 N.J.L. 311, 320, 39 Am. Rep. 592, 599 (1881).
19 45 Tenn. 326, 98 Am. Dec. 404 (1868).
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parties and persons, other than such acts and omissions as are prescribed
by the Code or other statutory enactments." The "Municipal Court of
Texarkana" was held to have been created as a court of record in Tur-
quette v. State.20 In Goodhart v. State,21 the court said: "The City Court
of New Haven is a court of record, and it is unquestionable that in this
state such a court has the inherent right . . ." The city charter was inter-
preted to give the contempt power in Fairclotb v. City of Macon.22 There
have been cases in which contempt power was based on statutes clearly
giving it, or readily implying it.28
It is of more than academic interest to note that the very existence of a
summary contempt power at common law is in serious doubt.24 In the
reports of the House of Commons in the Case of Sir Francis Burdett: Cases
of Commitments for Contempt by Courts of Justice,25 the committee of
the House of Commons endeavored to collect cases in support of recom-
mending a summary punishment of Sir Francis. The committee found
but five reported cases decided before 1765.26 The Report included these
five cases and two later reported cases, including the so-called "founda-
tion" 27 case, Rex v. Almon, 28 wherein this language is found: "The power
which the Courts in Westminster Hall have of vindicating their own
authority is coeval with their first foundation and institution; it is a neces-
sary incident to every Court of Justice, whether of record or not to fine
and imprison for a contempt of the Court, acted in the face of it .... "I
have examined very carefully to see if I could find out any vestiges or
trace of its introduction, but can find none. It is as ancient as any other
part of the common law ....
To this case it has been said that "the present law of concept in this
country has been founded . . . upon the statements of Blackstone in his
Commentaries and Sir John Eardley-Wilmot in King v. Almon which
20 174 Ark. 875, 298 S.W.15 (1927).
2184 Conn. 60, 62, 78 Atl. 853 (1911).
22 122 Ga. 795, 50 S.E. 915 (1905).
23 Ex parte Pescura, 17 Puerto Rico 706 (1911); Ex parte Hubbard, 63 Tex. 516, 140
S.W. 451 (1911); Rothman v. Rosmore, 155 Misc. 781, 281 N.Y.S. 637 (1935).
24 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); see generally STANSBURY, THE TRIAL OF
JAMES S. PECK, 372-425 (1833); THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT (1934);
Fox, HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT (1927); Goldfarb, The History of the Contempt
Power, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 1; Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress, 37 HAkiv. L.
REv. 1010 (1924).
25 8 HOWELL, STATE TRIALS 1349 (Appendix E, 1810).
26 This was noted by Commissioner Storrs in the trial of Judge Peck. See STANSBURY,
supra note 23, at 379.
27 For a general discussion, see Fox, King v. Olmon, 24 L.Q. REv. 184 (1908).
28 Wilmot's Ops. 243, 254, 97 Eng. Rep. 94 (1765).
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concerned a contempt by publication. Oddly enough, neither of these
authorities forms a legal precedent, for the opinion of Justice. .. Wilmot
was never delivered, as the case was dismissed .... 29 It also appears that
in all probability the statements made by Blackstone merely represented
the views of Judge Wilmot, and that it may be said that the present scope
of the summary power is due almost exclusively to the opinion of one
man." 0
The Report of the House of Commons also includes "file" cases (un-
reported), five in number, which mostly concerned interference with
service of process by such extra-legal means as throttling the sheriff.
Mr. Storrs, Commissioner, used the above mentioned report in the trial
for the impeachment of Judge James H. Peck before the United States
Senate, 31 with the able assistance of James Buchanan, later President of the
United States and soon to be draftsman of legislation concerning Federal
contempt powers.32 Commissioner Storrs, in a very scholarly manner,
tried to discredit the Almon and other cases enumerated in the Report.
He found that the only satisfactory explanation of the later growth of
contempt power must be that "Every action or word that was offensive
to the Stuart Kings or the political functionaries who supported their
doctrines or their designs, was swept into the star chamber under some
frivolous or refined pretext under the name of Contempt."33a
The order and dignity of the great Superior Courts of England (and
indeed of the special courts) were maintained by the usual proceedings
such as indictment or information, with trial by jury, except when the
offender confessed, or the offense, a common law crime-usually a libel,
was committed in the actual view of the court as a matter of public
record.34 Thus as before mentioned the historical standing of summary
contempt power, especially in the jurisdictions that rely on the common
law as the source of the power, is in serious doubt.
The power of the Municipal Court of Manchester, New Hampshire,
29 See 97 Eng. Rep. 94, note (a).
30 Thomas, supra note 24, at 5; see also Deutsch, United States v. Major General An-
drew Jackson, 46 A.B.A.J. 966 (1960); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 202 (1958).
31 Judge Peck was discharged by a vote of the Senate. See STANSBURY, supra note 23,
at 372 et seq.
32 1 Stat. 83 (1789) ; see 4 Stat. 487 (1831); Ex Parte Robinson, 19 Wall. (86 U.S.) 505
(1873); Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 23, at 1027: "So deeply did the Peck case
stir the country that State after State copied the new Federal law."
33 STANSBURY, supra note 23, at 390.
34 See generally, Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 23; see also Respublica v. Os-
wald, 1 Dall. (Pa.) 319 (1788); LIvINGSTON, SYSTEM OF PENAL LAW PREPARED FOR THE
STATE OF LOUISIANA, tit. V, ch. XI, 51-52 (1824).
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must now be examined. Clearly the court's powers are limited.35 It is
furthermore clear that no statutory enactment gives contempt power in
such a motor vehicle case.36 The local precedent as to the scope of the
contempt powers, as deemed inherent, is not clear.3 7 As pointed out by
Justice Kenison, 38 the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire limited the words used to "courts of general jurisdic-
tion. '3 9 The probate courts have their contempt powers granted by
statute.40 The court in question and others of its class have been given
express powers to punish for contempt in certain specified instances which
in no way touch upon the instant case. The legislative attention given to
these matters would indicate that the absence of a contempt statute for
such a motor vehicle case would be conscious and deliberate on the part
of these lawmakers. 4 1
In view of the cases involving city courts, in which no blanket recogni-
tions of contempt powers appear, the weak historical background,4 2 the
great distrust by many for rationalizations based on necessity such as could
admit improper things to our law, and of course these last observations,
the recognition by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire of contempt
power in all courts rests on a view which is not only a minority opinion
but is of a somewhat doubtful background a.4
It remains of interest to see what the Supreme Court, having thus recog-
nized contempt power, considers within its scope. Contempt has been de-
fined as: "disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a ...
judicial body, or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly be-
havior or insolent language in its presence, or so near thereto as to disturb
the proceedings or impair the respect due to such a body. '44 The mention
in this case of "acts or conduct which tend to obstruct or interfere with
the due and orderly administration of justice" 45 shows an approval of a
formula which has found its way into a number of decisions.46
35 New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated, Ch. 502 and elsewhere; hereinafter
cited as R.S.A.
86 This was pointed out by Kenison, C.J., dissenting, in Moquin at 544.
37 Refer to previous discussion.
38 Note 36, supra.
39 Opinion of the Justices, 86 N.H. 597, 602, 166 Atl. 640, 641 (1933).
40R.S.A. 592-A:15; Laws 1957, C. 244, n. 8; R.S.A. 165:19; R.S.A. 169:5; R.S.A.
169:35; Laws 1957, C. 214, s. 1; as noted by Kenison, C.J., dissenting, in Moquin at 544.
41 Such a conclusion would result, at least in the abstract, from accepted canons of
construction.
42 See previous discussions. 43 Note 56, infra.
44 DANGEL, CONTEMPT, 2 (1939); see note 50, infra.
45 191 A.2d 541, 543 (1963).
46 See WORDS AND PHRSES, "Contempt," for a compilation of such cases.
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina recently held that a court's
contempt power was limited in application thus: 47
Every act which tends to frustrate the mandates of a Court of justice is a
contempt of its authority; however it [the initiation of contempt proceedings]
can only issue in cases where the court which issues it has awarded some
process, given some judgment, made some legal Order, or done some act which
the party against whom it issues or on whom it is binding, has either neglected
to obey, contumaciously refused to submit to, incited others to defeat by arti-
fice or force, or treated with terms of contumely and disrespect in the face of
the court.
The variety of acts punished as contempt tests the imagination of man,
48
but in almost all the cases the acts had been directed to a court before
which proceedings were pending or in consequence of the actions of such
a court. Such was true in the case cited by the majority for a "take-the-
rap" scheme. 49
The case of State v. Treon cited by the majority offers no holding in
point, the relevant words being:
The fact is that the acts and conduct of this defendant and those associated
with him were contemptous, probably constituting indirect contempt.50 We
are not called upon to pass upon that question.51
In State v. Jaffrin,52 the defendant, because she had given money to a
"fixer," did not show up for the court appearance noted on the back of
her traffic ticket, necessitating an arrest warrant, to which she immediately
submitted. She was punished for contempt. In this case no questionable
conduct occurred while the court was in any way entertaining the case.
From this case the next logical step could well be contempt punishment
for any failure to appear. This is perhaps the only precedent for punishing
as contempt behavior coming entirely before the court commenced pro-
ceedings.
The only conduct of the defendants in this case is related by the ma-
jority opinion:53
Moquin further aided this predetermined deception and obstruction of justice
by pleading to these complaints in open court and Houghton, who was present,
4 7 Long v. McMillan, 226 S.C. 598, 609, 86 S.E.2d 477, 482 (1955).
48 See generally DANGEL, CONTEMPT, ch. XI, 115-71 (1939).
4 9 Berlandi v. Commonwealth, 316 Mass. 424, 50 N.E.2d 210 (1943); see majority
opinion in Moquin, at 543.
50 The classifications of contempts into direct and indirect, civil and criminal, and
the resulting consequences, are beyond the scope of this note. See generally Goldfarb,
The Varieties of the Contempt Power, 13 SYRACUSE L. R. 44 (1961).
51188 NE.2d 308, 318 (Ohio App. 1963); see majority opinion in Moquin, at 543.
52 136 N.E.2d 436 (Ohio App. 1956).
53 Majority opinion in Moquin, at 543-44.
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was equally a participant by his silence which constituted a tacit approval of
Moquin's action.
On previous occasion the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in the
case of State v. La Rose,54 described the plea of nolo contendere and its
implications:
Under the plea of nolo, the defendant does not confess or acknowledge the
charge against him as upon a plea of guilty . . .but waiving his right to con-
test the truth of the charge against him, submits to punishment. The plea is in
the nature of a compromise between the state and the defendant-a matter not
of right, but of favor. Various reasons exist why a defendant conscious of in-
nocence may be willing to forego his right to make defense if he can do so
without acknowledging his guilt. Whether in a particular case he should be
permitted to do so, is for the court.
This holding in no way hinted that a defendant conscious of innocence
so. pleading is contemptuous of the court, much less his tacit approver.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Moquin may have meant to
adopt the convenient fiction of an old Illinois case:
The court will punish all acts calculated to impede, embarrass, or obstruct
the court in the administration of justice. Such acts would be considered as
done in the presence of the court.55
In conclusion, the recognition of contempt power beyond the statutory
grants, as inherent because of necessity, rests on questionable grounds.58
It is submitted that the acts of the defendants, no matter how reprehensible
they might appear, were not contempt of court.
54 71 N.H. 435, 439, 52 Atl. 943, 945 (1902).
55 Stuart v. People, 3 Scam. (4 I1.) 395, 405 (1842).
56 A contrary argument could be made, if summary contempt powers were used dur-
ing Colonial and early Statehood days in New Hampshire, in light of the New Hamp-
shire Constitution (of 1784), Part II, Article 93, adopting, as the law of the land, "all the
laws which have heretofore been adopted, used, and approved. . . ."; but from realiza-
tion of the need for caution in interpreting the article, as urged by State v. Rollins, 8
N.H. 550 (1837), (applying the article to common law crimes), from not wanting to
reach the conclusion suggested by a critic of this work-but witchburning might thus
find Constitutional approbation, and from an unavailability of the necessary materials
for study, the matter was summarily dropped.
CONTRACTS-ENFORCEABILITY OF A
PROMISE OF A CONDITIONAL GIFT
Marie Bredemann was employed by Vaughan Mfg. Company from
1929 to 1954 as a biller and traffic manager. In 1943, Mr. Vaughan, then
president of the company, commended Mrs. Bredemann for her loyalty
and told her not to worry because "we intend to-I intend to see that you
